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21. Introduction
Economic liberalization is happening across the globe. Within the same indus-
trial sector, rms which have di¤erent technological capabilities or which are located
in regions with di¤erent types of institutions, may respond in a heterogeneous man-
ner to the competitive pressure imposed by the removal of barriers to entry during
liberalization episodes. In short, the e¤ects of liberalization may be unequal some
rms may benet whilst others su¤er, leading to growing within industry inequality
in industrial performance. This paper looks directly at this issue from both a the-
oretical and empirical standpoint. In doing so it departs from much of the recent
literature which attempts to evaluate the average e¤ects of economic liberalization
on industrial performance.1
To guide our research we construct a simple version of a Schumpeterian growth
model with entry threat. How rms respond to this entry threat by investing in new
technologies and production processes will be determined by two sets of factors, one
internal to rms and the other external. Technological capability of rms determines
their ability to compete with potential entrants. Firms close to the technological
frontier will be incentivised to invest and innovate whilst those far from frontier will
be disincentivised. The institutional environment in which rms operate which is
captured, for example, by the extent to which labor institutions are pro-employer
1See, for example, Pavcnik (2002), Topalova (2004) and the survey in Tybout (2003). Here we
review and highlight aspects of recent research pursued in a companion paper (see Aghion, Burgess,
Redding and Zilibotti 2004).
3in a given region, will also a¤ect the extent to which they respond to entry threats
via investment and innovation. For these reasons, as entry barriers come down with
liberalization we expect to observe growing divergence in economic performance
across industries within the same industrial sector but located in di¤erent regions
of a country.
It is this core prediction of entry liberalization leading to rising within industry
inequality that we take to the data. To do this we exploit a 3-digit state-industry
panel data set gathered by the Annual Survey of Industries in India for the period
1980-1997. In the period since Independence in 1947, India remained a relatively
closed economy with an extensive role for central planning of industry via licensing
and other instruments. The delicensing reforms of Rajiv Gandhi in 1985 and the
more substantial entry liberalization of 1991 marked a discrete break with the past.
To capture entry liberalization we construct a delicensing measure which records
when a given 3-digit industry was delicensed. We then relate this measure to in-
equality in economic performance across 3-digit state-industries within the same
3-digit industrial sector. This enables us to examine directly whether the reduction
in barriers to entry led to a divergence in industrial performance across Indian states
within the same 3-digit industrial sector as is predicted by the model.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some theory which enables
us to examine how the removal of barriers to entry a¤ects industrial performance
depending on the technological capacity of rms and their institutional environment.
4Section 3 presents empirical analysis of the link between entry liberalization and
within industry inequality using an Indian 3-digit state-industry panel for the period
1980-1997. Section 4 concludes.
2. The Model2
Consider the following version of the Schumpeterian discrete-time model of Ace-
moglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2004). The model economy consists of a set of states
(or regions) which di¤er in their factor endowments, distribution of productivities
across rms and labor market regulations.
All agents live for one period. In each period t a nal good (henceforth the
numeraire) is produced in each state by a competitive sector using a continuum one
of intermediate inputs, according to the technology:
ys;t =
1

[
Z 1
0
(As;t ())
1 xs;t () d]:
xs;t () is the quantity of intermediate input produced in sector ; state s and date
t; As;t () is a productivity parameter that measures the quality of the intermediate
input  in producing the nal good, and  2 (0; 1): The nal good can be used
either for consumption, or as an input in the process of production of intermediate
goods, or for investments in innovation. For simplicity, we drop the state index s
when this is not a source of confusion.
2This model was rst developed in Aghion, Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti (2004).
5In each intermediate sector  only one rm (a monopolist) is active in each
period, and property rights over intermediate rms are transmitted within dynasties.
A rm consists of an entrepreneur, who has the power to take decisions concerning
production and investments, workers that for simplicity we assume to be in a xed
number, and a technology to transform one unit of the nal good into one unit of
intermediate good of productivity At ().
Standard analysis (see Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti, 2004) shows that the
surplus generated by this rm is equal to 
1
1  (1  )At () : Entrepreneurs and work-
ers split this surplus according to the Nash rule. The share appropriated by each
of the parties, say  and (1   ), depend on their bargaining strengths, which is
assumed to depend on institutional features (state-specic labor legislation). Let
    11  (1  ) =: The equilibrium prot appropriated by the entrepreneur is,
then:
t() = At () :
Also, substituting for the equilibrium production level of each intermediate good,
xt(); in the production function for nal output, we obtain the total output level
yt = 
2 1
1  At where At 
R 1
0 At () d is the average productivity in the state.
2.1. Technological states, innovation, and entry
In every period, and within each state, intermediate rms di¤er in terms of their
current distance to the world technological frontier. We denote the productivity
6of the frontier technology at the end of period t by At and assume that this frontier
grows at the exogenous rate g. More formally:
At = At 1 (1 + g) :
At the beginning of period t (or, identically, at the end of period t   1), the
leading rm in the production of a particular intermediate input can be in two
states: (i) "high-productivity" rms have a productivity level At 1 () = At 1;
namely, are at the current frontier; (ii) "low-productivity" rms have a productivity
level At 1 () = At 2; namely, are one step behind it.
Before deciding their production plans, rms can undertake investments in tech-
nology adoption to increase their productivity. Innovative investments have a sto-
chastic return. In case of success, the incumbent rm can adopt the next most
productive technology, i.e., can increase its productivity by a factor 1 + g and keep
pace with the advancement of the technological frontier. The cost of technology
adoption is assumed to be quadratic in the probability of success and linear in the
level of technology:
ct () =
1
2
z2tAt 1 () ;
where z is the probability of success of the investment. If instead the investment is
not successful (probability 1  z), the rm produces with a productivity level equal
to its initial state.
7Wemake the following assumptions about rmsdynamics. If an advanced rm is
successful at t; it starts as an advanced rm at t+1: All other rms start as backward
rms (note that this implies that rms with a realized productivity equal to At 2
at t automatically upgrade their initial productivity due to some spillover e¤ect).
However, in this case, with an exogenous probability h; the leader is replaced by a
new rm starting as advanced at t+1. Let at denote the proportion of advanced
rms at t, and zA denote the innovative investment of advanced rms. Then the
productivity distribution is characterized by the following dynamics:
at+1 = zA;tat + h (1  ztat) = (1  h) zA;tat + h;
implying the steady-state proportion of advanced rms being equal to a = h1 zA(1 h) :
Intermediate rms are subject to competition from outsiders. In particular, we
assume that, in every period, an outsider can operate a hit-and-run entry in the local
market for a particular intermediate good.3 Outside rms observe the outcome of
the innovative investment of the local rm, and face the following decision. They
can either stay out of the market, or pay a small xed cost, ; and be granted
permission to sell in the local market with probability .4 Outsiders are assumed
have the frontier productivity, At:
3A variant of this model with permanent entry is developed by Aghion, Blundell, Gri¢ th,
Howitt and Brantl (2004) who then confront it with UK rm level data on entry threat, actual
entry, patenting and productivity growth.
4We can interpret  as the probability of success of an application for a license or in overcoming
other legal barriers to starting production.
8If an outsider enters and competes with a low productivity rm, it steals all the
market. If it competes with a high-productivity rm, however, Bertrand competition
drives the prots of both rms to zero. We assume the parameters to be such that
the outside rm will always nd it protable to try to enter if the market is controlled
by a low-productivity rm. However, the outsider will not try to enter if there is a
high-productivity incumbent. Therefore, the probability of entry in the market for
input  will be zero, if the local rm  was initially advancedand has undertaken
a successful innovative investment. Else, the probability is .
2.2. Equilibrium innovation investments
We now consider the decisions of incumbent producers in each of the techno-
logical states. Recall that all agents live for one period only, therefore incumbent
producers born at date t maximize the expected prots accruing at the end of the
same period t: This is a useful simplication that avoids the need to solve more
complicated dynamic problems.
Backward rms choose their investment so as to maximize expected prots, as
given by:
max
z
f z (1  ) At 1 + (1  z) (1  ) At 2  1
2
z2 At 2g;
9whose solution yields:
z =  (1  ) g = zB: (1)
Recall that backward rms can only make prots if there is no entry (probability
1  ). The productivity is At 1 if the investment is successful (probability z) and
At 2 if the investment is not successful (probability 1  z).5
Advanced rms choose their innovation investment in order to solve the following
program:
max
z
f z At + (1  z) (1  ) At 1  1
2
z2 At 1g
whose solution yields:
z =  (g + ) = zA: (2)
In this case, incumbent rms can prevent entry by successfully adopting the last
technology, which occurs with probability z: In this case, the local rm has a pro-
ductivity level At: The rm also retains the market if the investment is not successful,
but there is no entry. This event occurs with probability (1  ) (1  z). In this
case the rms productivity is At 1.
We interpret an increase of the entry threat, , as a liberalization reform.
Straightforward di¤erentiation of equilibrium innovation intensities with respect to
5One could generalize the model to allow for the possibility that through aggressive innovative
investments backward rms can catch-up with the frontier. This would create scope for defensive
innovation from backward rms when the probability of entry increases. As long as the probability
that backward rms can make large jumps is su¢ ciently low, this extension would not change
qualitatively the comparative statics of the model.
10
 yields:
@zA
@
=  > 0 and
@zB
@
=  g < 0: (3)
In other words, increasing the entry threat (e.g., through slashing barriers to entry
via delicensing) encourages innovation in advanced rms and discourages it in back-
ward rms. The intuition for these comparative statics is immediate. The higher
the threat of entry, the more important innovations will be in helping incumbent
rms already close to the technological frontier to retain the local market. However,
rms that are already far behind the frontier have no chance to win over a potential
entrant. Hence, a higher threat of entry will only lower the expected net gain from
innovation, thereby reducing the incentive for the incumbent to invest in innovation.
Next, consider the e¤ects of changes in labor market regulations on innovative
investments. Pro-worker regulations are captured by smaller 0s, as discussed
above. It is immediate that
@zA
@
= g +  > 0 and
@zB
@
= (1  ) g > 0:
Hence, pro-workers labor market regulations discourage innovation in all rms, but
they do so to a larger extent in advanced rms.
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2.3. Predictions for state-industries
We have so far assumed, for simplicity, that there is only one sector of activ-
ity. The stylized model presented above can be reinterpreted as describing a single
industry rather than the economy as a whole. Each state-industry should then be
viewed as an "island" populated by a set of competitive nal producers and a set of
non-competitive di¤erentiated intermediated producers. The products of di¤erent
industries are perfect substitutes in consumption, and the price of all nal goods
is set equal to unity. Thus, the equilibrium described in this section, as well as its
comparative statics, can be regarded as the equilibrium of a state-industry. The
average productivity of rms in state-industry is Ai;s;t =
R 1
0 Ai;s;t()d:
Steady-state productivity di¤erences across state-industries are assumed to be
driven by idiosyncratic state-industry e¤ects a¤ecting the exogenous probability of
upgrading, h; and in the state-specic parameter  (labor market regulation). More
formally,
ai;s =
hi;s
1  zA (1  hi;s) ;
where hi;s = h + "i;s: This representation allows us to introduce in a parsimonious
way steady-state productivity di¤erences across state-industries: more advanced
state-industries (conditional on labor market regulations) are those with high hi;ss.
The models predictions for rm behavior now hold at the level of state-industries
(see Aghion, Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti, 2004).
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3. The Unequal E¤ects of Liberalization6
State control of Indian industry was enshrined in the Industries (Development
and Regulation) Act of 1951 whereby rms required a licence in order to establish a
new factory, to expand capacity by more than 25% of existing levels, or to manufac-
ture a new product. These controls were supplemented with state controls on nan-
cial intermediation, imports, foreign direct investment and high tari¤ and non-tari¤
barriers as part of an overall strategy of centrally planned industrial development.
Licensing enabled the state to control the pattern of industrial development across
Indian states and to address regional disparities. India lived under this License
Rajfor the bulk of its post-colonial history, however, slow growth in the late-1960s
and 1970s (see Table 1) generated pressure for change culminating in Rajiv Gandhis
reforms of the mid-1980s where one third of Indian 3-digit manufacturing industries
were exempted from industrial licensing. A growing scal and balance of payment
crisis (which necessitated intervention by the IMF) and the assassination of Rajiv
Gandhi which led to the appointment of Narasimha Rao to Prime Minister and of
Manmohan Singh to Finance Minister precipated more dramatic internal and exter-
nal liberalization in 1991. Compulsory industrial licensing was abolished in all but
a few industries so that as of 1991 85% of all 3-digit manufacturing industries were
delicensed. There was also signicant reductions in tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers and
a loosening of controls on imports and foreign investment.
6This section is based on Aghion, Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti (2004).
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State panel data for the period 1960-1997 from Besley and Burgess (2004)
suggests that economic liberalization was associated with rising economic growth,
particularly in the manufacturing sector (see Table 1).7 Figure 1 examines the
evolution of cross-state inequality by graphing out the standard deviation of log
registered and unregistered manufacturing output per capita for the years 1960 to
1997. The distinction between these two sectors is germane as the unregistered
(informal) sector of small rms is not subject to licensing controls whereas the
registered (formal) sector of larger rms is.8 Inequality in registered manufacturing
output declines from 1960 until 1985 and then increases up to 1997. In line with
the predictions of the model we see that delicensing post-1985 is associated with
rising inequality in the regulated manufacturing sector.9 In contrast, inequality in
the unregulated manufacturing sector rises across the whole period.
Using Indian Annual Survey of Industries data we can carry out a similar exercise
looking at inequality across states within 3-digit registered manufacturing industries.
To do this we calculate the standard deviation across states of log gross output and
output per employee within a 3-digit manufacturing industry for each year between
1980 and 1997. Figure 2 graphs the three-year moving average of the median of
these within-industry standard deviations across this period. Consistent with the
model we observe growing inequality following the 1985 delicensing reforms, with
7See Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) and Topalova (2004).
8Manufacturing rms with more than ten employees with power or with more than twenty
without are classied as registered whereas rms below these cut-o¤s are classied as unregistered.
9The falling trend pre-1985 reects the use of licensing and other state controls to reduce regional
disparities in industrial development.
14
the within industry inequalizing e¤ects of liberalization becoming particularly strong
post-1991.10
To directly link within 3-digit industry inequality to industrial delicensing we
run regressions of the form:
yit = delicit + dt + i + uit
where i denotes a 3-digit registered manufacturing industry and t year, yit is an
economic outcome of interest, delicit is a 0=1 dummy which switches on when a
3-digit industry is delicensed, dt is a year dummy that controls for common macro-
economic shocks and will capture the overall e¤ects of the 1985 and 1991 liberal-
izations across all 3-digit industries, i is an industry xed e¤ect that controls for
unobserved heterogeneity across 3-digit industries, and uit is a stochastic error. To
allow for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the error term over time, the
standard errors are corrected for clustering at the 3-digit industry level. This is a
di¤erences in di¤erencesspecication, where the e¤ect of delicensing is identied
from the di¤erential change over time in the economic outcome in industries which
delicense relative to industries where compulsory industrial licensing is retained.
The delicit measure corresponds to the probability of entry measure u in the
10These ndings concerning aggregate and within-industry inequality are robust to considering
alternative measures of dispersion such as the coe¢ cient of variation or the di¤erence in log output,
log output per capita, or log output per worker at the 90th and 10th percentiles of the cross-state
distribution.
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model. We would therefore expect industrial delicensing to encourage entry.11 Col-
umn (1) of Table 2 conrms this where we see that delicensing increases the number
of factories in a 3-digit industry. We are now in a position to link entry liberaliza-
tion to inequality in industrial performance within 3-digit industries across states.
Columns (2) and (3) shows that delicensing leads to an increase in within industry
inequality in output and output per employee. Columns (4) and (5) show a similar
pattern for two superlative index measures of total factor productivity.
This nding of rising inequality following entry liberalization is consistent with
the theoretical model which emphasizes how a common reform may have uneven
e¤ects on the performance of state-industries within a given industrial sector. In
Aghion, Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti (2004) we explore how a state-industys dis-
tance to the Indian technological frontier and state specic labor market institutions
can help us understand rising within 3-digit industry inequality across the 1980-1997
period.12
11This view is conrmed in the Government of Indias own o¢ cial reports (e.g. Reports of
the 1969 Industrial Licencing Policy Enquiry Committee and the 1985 Narasimhan Committee on
Replacement of Physical by Financial Controls).
12The paper is contribution to the growing literature which emphasises that a rms distance from
the technoligical frontier will determine the extent to which it benets from entry. Sabirianova,
Svenjar and Terrell (2004), for example, nd that greater presence of foreign rms in a given
industry has a negative average e¤ect on the productive e¢ ciency of Czech and Russian domestic
rms but the e¤ect is positive on the e¢ ciency of other foreign owned rms.
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4. Conclusions
The world has tended to divide between those who are for or against liberal-
ization. Reality it turns out is more nuanced there can no a priori assumption
that industry in a particular region of a country will benet from or be harmed
by liberalization. Consistent with our theoretical model we nd that entry dereg-
ulation elicited heterogeneous responses from industries in the same 3-digit sector
but located in di¤erent states of India. This is an important nding as it suggests
that actions by rms to upgrade technological capability or by policy makers to im-
prove the institutional environment will have a central bearing on whether industry
in a given sector and state benets from or is harmed by the process of economic
liberalization. Identication of policies which enable local industry to benet from
economic liberalization is where the research frontier now lies. The combination
of economic theory and microeconomic data sources, together with an emphasis
on incentives and technology, provides a fruitful avenue for further research on the
microeconomics of industrial development.
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Table 1 : Economic Growth in India, 1960-97 
Annual Growth SDP per 
capita 
Annual Growth 
Manufacturing SDP per 
capita 
Annual Growth Registered 
Manufacturing 
SDP per capita 
1960-70 2.82% 1.89% 2.58% 
1970-80 1.53% 3.90% 3.39% 
1980-85 2.90% 4.17% 5.78% 
1985-90 3.76% 5.68% 6.92% 
1991-97 4.06% 6.90% 8.19% 
 
Notes: SDP denotes real state domestic product.  Nominal domestic product in each state is deflated using a rural-urban 
population weighted average of the consumer price indices for industrial workers and agricultural laborers.  Registered 
manufacturing corresponds to all factories with more than 10 employees with power or more than 20 employees 
without power.  The data source is Besley and Burgess (2004). 
 
 
 
Table 2: Delicencing, Entry and Within-industry Inequality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Number of 
Factories 
St Dev 
 ln(Y) 
St Dev 
 ln(Y/L) 
St Dev 
ln(TFP1) 
St Dev 
 ln(TFP2) 
Industry delicenced 87.581** 0.131*** 0.066*** 0.051** 0.052** 
 (36.311) (0.040) (0.021) (0.024) (0.025) 
Observations 1764 1764 1764 1764 1764 
R-squared 0.97 0.65 0.64 0.37 0.37 
      
Industry fixed 
effects 
YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Notes: sample is an industry-time panel on three-digit manufacturing industries during 1980-97 from the Indian 
Annual Survey of Industries (ASI).  See Aghion, Burgess, Zilibotti and Redding (2004).  Industry delicenced is an 
industry-time measure of delicensing, which takes the value 1 if the industry is delicensed in a particular year and 0 
otherwise.  Number of factories is the number of factories active in an industry and year.  St Dev denotes the standard 
deviation across states within an industry and year.  ln(Y) is log real gross output.  ln(Y/L) is log real gross output per 
employee.  ln(TFP1) is log superlative index Total Factor Productivity.  ln(TFP2) is log superlative index Total Factor 
Productivity, including non-production and production workers as separate factors of production.  Output, employees 
and other factor inputs are from the ASI.  Price deflators are from the Handbook of Industrial Statistics.  Standard 
errors in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust and adjusted for clustering on industry.  * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
.3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
U
n
r
e
g
i
s
t
e
r
e
d
.
6
.
6
5
.
7
.
7
5
.
8
.
8
5
R
e
g
i
s
t
e
r
e
d
60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Year...
Registered Unregistered
State Domestic Product (SDP) National Accounts data from Besley and Burgess (2004)
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